Transferable utility
Transferable utility is a concept in cooperative game theory and in economics. Utility is transferable if one player can losslessly transfer part of its utility to another player. Such transfers are possible if the players have a common currency that is valued equally by all. Note that being able to transfer cash payoffs does not imply that utility is transferable: wealthy and poor players may derive a different utility from the same amount of money.
Transferable utility is assumed in many cooperative games, where the payoffs are not given for individual players, but only for coalitions. In this case the assumption implies that irrespective of the division of the coalitional payoff, members of the coalition enjoy the same total utility.
References
Myerson, Roger B. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 568. ISBN 0-674-34116-3.
- v
- t
- e
- Congestion game
- Cooperative game
- Determinacy
- Escalation of commitment
- Extensive-form game
- First-player and second-player win
- Game complexity
- Graphical game
- Hierarchy of beliefs
- Information set
- Normal-form game
- Preference
- Sequential game
- Simultaneous game
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- Solved game
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- Mechanism design
concepts
- Bayes correlated equilibrium
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Berge equilibrium
- Core
- Correlated equilibrium
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
- Epsilon-equilibrium
- Evolutionarily stable strategy
- Gibbs equilibrium
- Mertens-stable equilibrium
- Markov perfect equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium
- Pareto efficiency
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Proper equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibrium
- Quasi-perfect equilibrium
- Risk dominance
- Satisfaction equilibrium
- Self-confirming equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
- Shapley value
- Strong Nash equilibrium
- Subgame perfection
- Trembling hand equilibrium
of games
- Go
- Chess
- Infinite chess
- Checkers
- All-pay auction
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Gift-exchange game
- Optional prisoner's dilemma
- Traveler's dilemma
- Coordination game
- Chicken
- Centipede game
- Lewis signaling game
- Volunteer's dilemma
- Dollar auction
- Battle of the sexes
- Stag hunt
- Matching pennies
- Ultimatum game
- Rock paper scissors
- Pirate game
- Dictator game
- Public goods game
- Blotto game
- War of attrition
- El Farol Bar problem
- Fair division
- Fair cake-cutting
- Bertrand competition
- Cournot competition
- Stackelberg competition
- Deadlock
- Diner's dilemma
- Guess 2/3 of the average
- Kuhn poker
- Nash bargaining game
- Induction puzzles
- Trust game
- Princess and monster game
- Rendezvous problem
- Aumann's agreement theorem
- Folk theorem
- Minimax theorem
- Nash's theorem
- Negamax theorem
- Purification theorem
- Revelation principle
- Sprague–Grundy theorem
- Zermelo's theorem
figures
- Albert W. Tucker
- Amos Tversky
- Antoine Augustin Cournot
- Ariel Rubinstein
- Claude Shannon
- Daniel Kahneman
- David K. Levine
- David M. Kreps
- Donald B. Gillies
- Drew Fudenberg
- Eric Maskin
- Harold W. Kuhn
- Herbert Simon
- Hervé Moulin
- John Conway
- Jean Tirole
- Jean-François Mertens
- Jennifer Tour Chayes
- John Harsanyi
- John Maynard Smith
- John Nash
- John von Neumann
- Kenneth Arrow
- Kenneth Binmore
- Leonid Hurwicz
- Lloyd Shapley
- Melvin Dresher
- Merrill M. Flood
- Olga Bondareva
- Oskar Morgenstern
- Paul Milgrom
- Peyton Young
- Reinhard Selten
- Robert Axelrod
- Robert Aumann
- Robert B. Wilson
- Roger Myerson
- Samuel Bowles
- Suzanne Scotchmer
- Thomas Schelling
- William Vickrey